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Abstract
Governments in the EU frequently bail out firms in distress by granting state aid.
I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine two issues: the
effectiveness of bailouts in preventing bankruptcy and the determinants of bailout
policy.
The results are threefold. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate increases
during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that
some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. The number of failing
bailouts could be reduced if European control was tougher. Second, governments’
bailout decisions favored state-owned firms, even though state-owned firms did not
outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an en-
dogenous variable in the analysis of the hazard rate. Treating it as exogenous
underestimates its impact on the bankruptcy probability. Several policy implica-
tions of the results are discussed in the paper.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effectiveness of bailouts in the European
Union (EU). Bailouts in the EU are pursued by governments in order to save endangered
jobs, support development in certain regions, or promote a certain type of economic activ-
ity. Such subsidies also have an impact on competition in the European common market,
therefore the European Commission strictly controls them: whenever a government wants
to bail out a firm, it must get an approval from the Commission. I examine the effective-
ness of bailouts in maintaining survival of firms in distress and I assess European bailout
control from this perspective. I also provide empirical evidence on the criteria used by
governments in their bailout decisions.
The reasons why some governments bail out are often of political nature. Helping
a firm in trouble draws media attention and voters’ sympathy, as in the case of Ger-
many’s chancellor, Gerhard Schro¨der, who gained on political support after bailing out
the construction firm Philipp Holzmann.1 Potentially, there are also economic reasons
for bailouts. Due to time-inconsistency of their objectives, governments may lack com-
mitment to a hard no-bailout policy and thereby create soft-budget constraints for firms
(Boadway et al., 1995). This is particularly likely in the case of state-owned firms, where
there is no separation of ownership and creditor rights (Lin et al., 1998) and where social
goods are often produced (Ro¨ller and Zhang, 2005). If a failing firm is a monopolist in
providing statewide services necessary for economic activities, e.g. railways, a bailout
may be needed to avoid a large negative externality on the whole economy (Segal, 1998).
A bailout might also be a part of the strategic trade policy with the aim of increasing
the market power of domestic firms, at the cost of competing firms from other countries
(G lowicka, 2005; Neary, 1994). Finally, if the bankruptcy results in many lost jobs in a
region with high unemployment, a bailout might be socially justified.
Bailouts are frequently undertaken by EU governments2 and paid with tax revenues.
1A good illustration of the perception of this decision is a title page of Tageszeitung on the day after
the bailout decision, Nov. 26, 1999: “Holzmann bails out Schro¨der” (“Holzmann saniert Schro¨der”),
suggesting that it was actually Schro¨der’s political career which was bailed out.
2A bailout does not need to be a transfer of resources, it may also be a soft position in debt recovery.
For example, when firms in a deteriorating condition do not pay taxes or social security obligations and
1
Between 1992 and 2003, 79 firms in difficulty were supported by European governments
with the aid often expressed in billions of euros.3 Governments support firms for a short
period of time to help them work out a plan of further action (rescue aid) or they subsidize
the restructuring process in the firm (restructuring aid). Every bailout decision must be
notified to the European Commission. This is required, because a bailout is a highly
selective subsidy: its recipient is one specific inefficient firm, which cannot stay in the
market without public support. This kind of aid is likely to distort competition, since
it acts directly against competitive forces, which led to the risk of exit. Such practices
are forbidden in the EU by the European competition law, but they can be granted
an exemption according to the Article 87 of the EC Treaty. Here, countries’ industrial
policies and EU’s competition policy meet and engage in a battle: governments bail out
firms of their choice pursuing their own unilateral policies, but the Commission forbids the
aid if it adversely affects fair competition in the common market. Bailouts in particular
are regulated by the Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
Firms in Difficulty4 and in the EU terminology are called rescue and restructuring (R&R)
aid. The European state aid control is now under a “comprehensive, coherent and far-
reaching reform” with an objective of “less and better targeted state aid.”5 More economic
approach to aid control is introduced in several state aid areas (Friederiszick et al., 2006).
For this process, a better understanding of how R&R subsidies have worked in the past
is crucial.
Bailout control takes place only in Europe, as there is no equivalent bailout policy
in the United States. A recent exception is perhaps the Air Transportation Stabilization
Board created by the Congress in 2001 with the objective of supporting airlines survival
public institutions are more patient in recovering the debt than a private creditor would be, the firm gets
an advantage over its competitors. This was the main issue in the case C-276/02 in the European Court
of Justice, as discussed in Nicolaides and Kekelekis (2005).
3For example, in 2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG received EUR 9,7 bn rescue and restructuring aid,
while the total aid, less agriculture and railways, granted by 15 EU member states amounted to EUR 49
bn.
4OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p.2.
5Reforming Europes State Aid Regime: An Action Plan for Change, speech by Neelie Kroes, who
is a Member of the European Commission in charge of Competition Policy, during the Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr and the University of Leiden joint conference on European State Aid Reform.
Brussels, 14th June 2005.
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after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. Vig (2004) describes the activities
of this Board as a dismal failure, since none of the big carriers took part in the loan
guarantee program announced by the Board. The reason was that the carriers did not
want to give away equity stakes in return for the bailout, which was one of the conditions
of getting the loan. This outcome is a warning that subsidizing firms in difficulty is not
an easy task.
I analyze R&R aid granted to 79 firms from 10 EU countries during the years 1992-
2003. The list of bailed-out firms is fixed and I collect additional information on these
firms, which makes it a unique data set. The additional information comes from four
sources: decision texts of the Commission, London Economics (2004) report to the Com-
mission, the AMADEUS data base and newspapers. The research objective is to examine
if bailouts in the EU have achieved their goals. The goal of a bailout is preventing firm’s
bankruptcy. A bankruptcy (or exit) is defined as ceasing operations of a firm. If a firm
becomes insolvent, sells most of their assets, reduces employment dramatically and stays
active in the market, it is also counted as bankrupt.
I study three issues. First, I ask the question: how did the risk of bankruptcy change
after the bailout? To provide an answer, I estimate the hazard rate of all R&R aid
beneficiaries. The results show that in the first four years after the bailout firms exit
at an increasing rate. This indicates that a bankruptcy after the bailout does not occur
randomly, but is a result of a wasteful behavior: firms went bankrupt with delay, because
they could afford to survive a bit longer with the means granted by the state. A total of
29.3% of the subsidized firms exit anyway. Predictions from the hazard equation suggest
that the Commission could have reduced this failure rate by prohibiting rescue aid in
sectors with small externalities for the economy. The required standard of proof in the
Commission’s bailout approvals should be at least a 70% chance of survival for four years
after the bailout.
Second, I find that firms receiving a restructuring subsidy go bankrupt less often than
rescue aid receivers. Allocation of these two types of aid to different firms is therefore a
tool for discrimination. The results on the choice of subsidy type suggest that state-owned
3
firms receive restructuring aid with higher probability due to governments’ preference for
public employment. Once I control for public employment, being a state-owned firm
becomes a disadvantage in chances for restructuring aid. All state-owned firms which
were later privatized received exclusively restructuring aid, as well as state-owned firms
older than 100 years. This special position of state-owned firms is likely to cause soft
budget constraints in state-owned enterprizes in Europe. I also find a strong time trend
in the data: after the year 2000 rescue aid was more likely than restructuring aid, while
the opposite is true for the years up to 2000. This is likely to be a result of the political
campaign at the European level to reduce R&R aid, which started with the Lisbon Agenda
in 2000. As a consequence of this tendency, however, more firms are granted aid which is
less efficient in preventing bankruptcy.
Third, I reject the hypothesis that the subsidy type is exogenous in the hazard es-
timation. Governments select firms that get more comprehensive restructuring aid and
influence the firm’s survival chances by this choice. The impact of the endogenous subsidy
type on the hazard rate is stronger than in the case of the exogenous subsidy type. Thus,
without taking the endogeneity into account, the effect of the subsidy type on the hazard
is underestimated.
The literature most relevant for this paper are empirical studies on bankruptcy predic-
tion. Such studies typically use firm-level accounting data to predict duration of Chapter
11 protection in the American bankruptcy law. Shumway (2001) advocates survival analy-
sis as the most appropriate econometric technique to predict bankruptcy. Bandopadhyaya
(1994) finds the counterintuitive result that the higher the outstanding interest of the firm,
the earlier the firm gets over its difficulties. His explanation is that creditors are more will-
ing to compromise in negotiations when the debt is high. Li (1999) develops a Bayesian
approach to hazard estimation. In both papers, the probability of exiting Chapter 11 pro-
tection increases during the first two years. My result is exactly opposite: the probability
of bankruptcy increases with time during the first four years.
Both R&R aid and Chapter 11 have the same aim: to prevent bankruptcy. Couwenberg
(2001) estimates that 41% of firms under Chapter 11 protection during the years 1980-
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1996 restructure successfully and come back to vitality. Looking at major cases, however,
the success rate is close to 100% (Li, 1999). These numbers are achieved without any
transfers from the state to the firms in trouble. For R&R aid during the years 1995-2003,
the share of survivors amounts to 70.7%. This outcome suggests that there is scope for
improvement in the European bailout policy. The crucial difference between Chapter 11
protection and R&R aid is the incentives they create. Managers avoid Chapter 11 ex
ante, since the likely outcome of starting bankruptcy proceedings is that creditors will
get a part of the equity. In addition, under Chapter 11 protection firms incur legal and
opportunity costs. R&R aid, in turn, requires no transfers of equity to creditors. The
firm gets a transfer from the taxpayers, which allows firms to continue operations. Thus,
the incentives of European managers to avoid bankruptcy are not as strong. Therefore,
I provide empirical support for the suggestion of Nitsche and Heidhues (2006) that R&R
aid should be linked to bankruptcy proceedings, for example by granting aid only to firms
that formally file for bankruptcy. Such a condition would have more severe consequences
for managers who failed to restructure the firm earlier, since it signals managers’ failure
to the market. Managers would then have stronger incentives not to ask for aid.
Papers evaluating state aid programs are more and more popular (for an overview see
Heckman (2001)), but concerning bailouts in the EU the only empirical analysis was done
by Chindooroy et al. (2005) (based on the LE report (2004) by the same authors). Their
paper provides summary statistics about the cases and a discrete choice estimation of
survival probability. They find that about 30% of R&R aid beneficiaries went bankrupt,
which they attribute to the business cycle. My paper is different from theirs in several
ways. Since hazard models give better survival probability estimates (Shumway, 2001), I
use the hazard approach.6 It allows me to compare R&R aid to the Chapter 11 protection,
for which the hazard rate estimates exist already. I also analyze governments’ bailout
policies, which is an entirely new research topic. Finally, I investigate the interdependence
between the subsidy choice and bankruptcy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the legal framework
6Jenkins (2004) provides an excellent guide to discrete-time hazard rate estimation.
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for bailouts in the EU and provides some summary statistics on how the guidelines were
applied during the years 1995-2003. Next, I estimate the hazard rate of R&R aid benefi-
ciaries, compare it to Chapter 11 hazard rates and assess the effectiveness of bailouts in
preventing bankruptcy. In section 4, I empirically examine governments’ choices to grant
rescue versus restructuring aid and I explore the endogeneity of the subsidy choice in the
hazard rate analysis. Finally, I sum up in the last section.
2 Rescue and Restructuring state aid in the Euro-
pean state aid control
2.1 State aid in the EC Treaty
Article 87 (1) of the EC Treaty7 provides legal constraints to state aid in the EU. State
aid is incompatible with the common market, and therefore in general prohibited, when
it fulfils four conditions: it is granted from state resources, distorts or threatens to distort
competition, favors certain undertakings, and affects trade between member states. If one
of the conditions is not satisfied, state aid law does not apply. For example, European
subsidies for farmers are not incompatible, since the selectivity condition is not fulfilled:
all farmers receive them. If a local ferry between islands of the same country is subsidized,
trade between member states is not affected and the European state aid law does not apply.
But when the ferry connects two different member states, the aid is incompatible with
the common market. Only three types of aid are per se considered compatible (Article
87 (2)): social aid granted to individuals which does not discriminate with respect to the
origin of the products, aid to remedy natural disasters and aid to compensate economic
disadvantages of the the division of the Federal Republic of Germany in the last century.
Article 87 (3) gives the Commission discretion to grant exemptions to state aid pro-
hibition in five cases:
a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is ab-
normally low or where there is serious underemployment;
7OJ C 325, 24.12.2002, p.67.
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b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or
to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;
c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to
the common interest;
d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading
conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common
interest;
e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council acting by a
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.8
Article 88 makes the European Commission and the member states responsible for
the control of the compatibility of all state aid measures in the EU. Governments should
notify the Commission about state aid measures they plan to take and they must take the
opinion of the Commission about aid compatibility with the common market into account
when deciding on the aid. Third parties can submit their comments on government aid.
Finally, if illicit aid was granted, the Commission can demand the aid to be altered,
abolished or repaid.
Article 89 gives the Council the right to introduce regulations about the implementa-
tion of Article 87 and 88, as well as exemptions from the regulations. An important block
exemption is a de minimis rule,9 which states that aid not exceeding EUR 100 000 over a
continuous period of three years is not considered incompatible with the common market.
The rule was introduced to reduce the cost of administrative burden on the Commission
created by state aid control and to facilitate subsidies for small and medium enterprizes
(SME), which are expected to use low amounts of R&R aid more often. The ceiling
amount in the de minimis rule is a gross grant or its equivalent. The rule does not apply
to transport, shipbuilding, agriculture, fisheries sectors, export-related activities, and aid
promoting domestic over imported products. Other block exemptions concern training
8ibidem.
9OJ L 10, 13.1.2001, p.30. In 2006 the Commission proposed to increase the ceiling of the de minimis
rule to 200 000 EUR, but the decision to adopt it was not yet made.
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aid, employment aid and aid for SMEs. The structure of state aid control is depicted in
figure 1.
Figure 1: The Commission investigates aid’s compatibility with the com-
mon market in cases left to its discretion.
State
Aid
-
-
-
-
per se compatible
block exemptions
EC discretion
per se incompatible
-
-
-
-
allowed automatically
allowed
investigated and approved
prohibited
The Commission has worked out several documents defining the rules in the state aid
control process, depending on the objective and the instrument of aid. So-called horizon-
tal guidelines explain which aid can be approved depending on its objective: regional aid,
aid for research and development (R&D), environmental aid, aid for risk capital and aid
for rescuing and restructuring (R&R) firms in difficulty all have their guidelines published
in the Official Journal of the European Union. Sectors like broadcasting, coal, shipbuild-
ing, steel, electricity, postal services, synthetic fibres and motor vehicles also have their
specific rules. Finally, regulations define how governments are allowed to use specific aid
instruments (state guarantees, public land sales, export credit insurance and fiscal aid).
2.2 Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Re-
structuring Firms in Difficulty
At the Commission’s discretion, rescue and restructuring aid for a firm in difficulty may
be considered compatible with the common market based on Article 87 (3), points a) and
c). Governments may support certain industries or sustain jobs in poor or dependent
on one big firm regions in order to facilitate social and regional cohesion. Detailed rules,
according to which the Commission decides on such cases, are specified in the Community
Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty,10 described
10OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p.2.
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in the remainder of this section.
The guidelines explain the way the European Commission exercises its discretion in
the field of bailouts. The guidelines were adopted in 1994, amended in 1999 and 2004,
and the current version – on which I focus here – stays in power until October 9, 2009.
The general approach of the Commission to R&R aid is that it is the most problematic
type of subsidies. R&R aid is directed towards inefficient firms, so it is likely to act
directly against competitive forces that drive the firm out of the market. According
to the guidelines, R&R subsidies are justified only in three circumstances: by social or
regional cohesion considerations, to support small and medium-sized enterprizes, and in
presence of a menace of high market concentration. While the first objective is a matter
of social judgement, the remaining two are economic issues.
A firm liable to R&R aid, called a firm in difficulty, is ”unable, whether through
its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its owners/shareholders or
creditors, to stem losses which, without outside intervention by the public authorities, will
almost certainly condemn it to going out of business in the short or medium term.”11 Such
firms typically have ”increasing losses, diminishing turnover, growing stock inventories,
excess capacity, declining cash flow, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling or
nil net asset value.”12 This includes also firms that filed for insolvency, subsidiaries of
firms that are also in difficulty, or subsidiaries, which prove that the state of difficulty is
their own responsibility and the parent cannot help. Newly created firms (up to 3 years
old) are not eligible for R&R aid. The most important element of the definition is that
without the subsidy the firm would exit the market - only a state intervention can keep
it in operation.
Bailouts consist of two kinds of subsidies: rescue and restructuring. While a rescue
subsidy keeps the firm in operation for the time needed to asses the situation and prepare
a plan of further action, restructuring aid is a long-term assistance in the implementation
of the restructuring plan, which must aim at restoring firm’s viability. Each of rescue and
restructuring subsidies can be granted only once every ten years (five in the agricultural
11ibidem, p.3.
12ibidem.
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sector). This is the so-called one time – last time principle and refers to all types of
beneficiaries: large firms, groups of firms, firms in assisted areas and SME’s. If both aid
types are granted, the order also matters: rescue aid should be given before restructuring
aid, otherwise the restructuring process failed to restore viability and a firm is not eligible
for the rescue subsidy. From the economic point of view, strict application of the one time
– last time principle is crucial, since it reduces efficiency distortions caused by soft-budget
constraints.
Rescue aid is granted as a loan or a loan guarantee at a market interest rate for a
maximum of six months. After that time, a plan of restructuring or a liquidation plan
must be presented to the Commission. In principle, there is a maximum amount of rescue
aid, which depends on earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation and working capital
according to a formula in the appendix to the guidelines, but exceptions are possible.
Restructuring subsidy is granted only to those firms that present a convincing plan
of restoring the firm’s long-term viability and a market survey. If the market power of
the beneficiary is significant, the Commission imposes compensatory measures such as
divestiture of assets or reduction in capacity. The beneficiary is expected to make a
significant contribution to cover restructuring costs: 25% in case of a small firm, 40% for
a medium-sized firm and 50% for a large firm. The implementation of the restructuring
plan should be communicated to the Commission by reports at least annually.
Aid for large firms must be notified individually each time, while for SMEs aid schemes
are possible. SMEs (with the exception of the agricultural sector) and firms from assisted
areas have less strict rules as far as compensatory measures and reporting are concerned.
The guidelines do not apply to coal and steel sectors.
2.3 Summary statistics
In the time period from 1995 to 2003, the Commission made 86 decisions on granting
individual R&R subsidies to 79 firms from 10 EU countries. The first statistical study
of the decisions was done by Chindooroy et al. (2005). In this section, I revise summary
statistics related to further questions addressed in this paper. A cross-sectional data set
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is used, with each decision as a unit observation.13
The decisions I analyze were made during the years 1995-2003. The starting year is
1995, which is the first year when decisions were based on the guidelines on R&R aid.
In some cases, however, the subsidy was notified ex post, hence the year of granting aid
was earlier than the decision itself. The last year is 2003, just before the EU enlargement
and introduction of the new version of the guidelines. The most aid-intensive period was
1996-1998 with 13-15 subsidies granted each year. After 1998, the number of cases has
halved and oscillated around 7 (see table 1).
Table 1: Year of granting R&R subsidy.
Subsidy year Rescue cases Restructuring cases Total
1992 0 1 1
1993 0 1 1
1994 1 5 6
1995 3 5 8
1996 5 8 13
1997 6 9 15
1998 3 11 14
1999 1 5 6
2000 0 2 2
2001 6 2 8
2002 6 2 8
2003 3 1 4
Total 34 52 86
Population: Cross-section of decisions.
There is a clear tendency of granting more rescue aid in recent years. Before 2001,
the number of rescue cases was lower than restructuring aid cases. Starting with 2001,
this tendency was reversed. The change in the pattern coincides with the Commission’s
increased political efforts to limit state aid. For example, the Lisbon Agenda in 2000
encouraged the EU governments to cut state aid for inefficient firms and redirect it to
firms with potential for innovation and growth.
13For the description of the data set construction procedure, see the Appendix B.
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Differences between rescues and restructures
The nature of a rescue subsidy as defined by the guidelines is very different from re-
structuring aid. While the former can be granted to any firm with an acute problem
as a short-term solution, restructuring aid is a long-term assistance with viability as an
objective. Table 2 reveals that differences indeed exist. For each subsidy type, I report
the total number of firms receiving such aid, followed by the number of state-owned and
private firms, the number of bankrupt and surviving firms, the number of firms sold af-
ter the subsidy and average employment. State-ownership means that the state controls
more than 50% of the firm’s capital. Bankruptcy and sale are observed in the time period
between the subsidy and 2003. Note that ownership status is known only for 69 firms and
survival status only for 75 firms (bottom row of table 2).
Table 2: Differences between subsidy types.
Subsidy type Total State-owned Private Bankrupt Survived Sold Avg.
empl
Rescue 27 5 19 13 13 4 3404
Double rescue 1 1 0 1 0 0 1791
Restructure 45 21 17 8 34 18 6333
Double restructure 1 1 0 0 1 0 3508
Rescue and restructure 5 2 3 0 5 1 8730
Total 79 30 39 22 53 23 5340
Population: Cross-section of firms.
The first observation is that there were many more restructuring aid than rescue aid
cases. Seven firms received a double subsidy. Five of them were rescue cases followed by
restructuring aid, which is the pattern promoted by the guidelines. In the other two cases,
the one time -last time principle was clearly violated. Nearly a half of restructuring aid
cases concerned state-owned firms, while less than one-fifth of rescue cases involved public
firms. In addition, only state-owned firms benefited from the two cases breaking the one
time -last time principle. The null hypothesis that ownership and the subsidy type are
independent is rejected based on the Pearson’s chi-squared test at 5% significance level.14
14This is only very weak evidence of the correlation, since I have few observations and Pearson’s chi-
squared test uses a limit distribution.
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If one agrees that restructuring aid is more attractive to firms in difficulty than rescue
aid, then the data suggest that state-owned firms had a favorable treatment.
Turning to the bankruptcy rate, 22 firms went bankrupt, which makes about 30% of
all bailed-out firms. The distribution of bankruptcies is biased towards rescues: a half
of all rescue aid cases ended up with a bankruptcy, compared with less than a quarter
of restructuring aid cases. The null hypothesis that the type of subsidy is independent
of bankruptcy is rejected based on the Pearson’s test at 2% significance level. The bias
towards rescues is natural given the characteristics of rescue aid, which is only temporary
and is not meant to support a restructuring process. Restructuring aid, however, should
never end up with bankruptcy -its aim is to get the firm back to viability. This aim was
not achieved in 8 cases out of 45 total (17.7%).
Regarding the distribution of firms that were sold to a new owner after receiving the
subsidy, a higher proportion of restructured firms were sold than the proportion of rescued
firms. This suggests that a restructuring subsidy can be used to increase the value of a
firm in difficulty before sale, for example before privatization. Out of 28 state-owned firms,
13 were privatized after receiving a restructuring subsidy. In a few cases, privatization
was even a condition for R&R aid approval demanded by the Commission. All privatized
firms survived.
Finally, looking at average employment, firms with restructuring aid had on average
more employees than firms receiving rescue aid. This suggests a too-big-to-fail effect,
meaning that bigger firms get more support from the state in case of distress, because
their exit would potentially have a larger negative externality on the state-wide or regional
economy.
Bailout policies in European countries
The EU member states use R&R subsidies in a very differentiated way. Table 3 highlights
the differences across countries in detail. For each country, I report the total number
of subsidized firms, the number of rescue and restructuring subsidy types granted, the
number of state-owned and private firms, the number of bankrupt and surviving firms,
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the number of firms sold after the subsidy, and finally, average employment in subsidized
firms.
Table 3: Differences across countries.
Country Firms
No.
Restr. Rescue Public Private Bankrupt Survived Sold Avg. empl.
Greece 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 7 529
Netherlands 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 906
Austria 4 3 3 1 3 1 3 1 390
UK 4 2 2 2 2 0 4 2 4 640
France 11 9 3 9 2 0 11 6 19 187
Portugal 4 4 1 1 1 0 3 1 141
Spain 10 8 2 5 5 4 6 2 928
Italy 15 10 6 6 5 6 7 5 5 447
Belgium 4 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 3 037
Germany 24 12 14 3 20 9 15 5 3 774
Total 79 52 34 30 39 22 53 23 5 340
Population: Cross-section of decisions.
Germany leads with 24 bailed-out firms, followed by Italy, France and Spain with 15,
11 and 10 firms respectively. Notably, there are also 5 member states that did not bailout
any firm (not in the table): Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxemburg and Sweden. While
in case of Luxemburg one can have doubts if this result is because of government’s policy
or economy size, in the other four cases it looks like a hard no-bailout policy.
A comparison of the policies of Germany and France provides interesting insights.
Among 24 Germany’s beneficiaries, the majority received rescue aid. Only 3 beneficiaries
were state-owned and employment was lower than the total average. In contrast, France
used mainly restructuring aid, mainly directed to state-owned firms and had the highest
number of sold firms. French bailed-out firms employed four times more people than
the total average and none of them went bankrupt. These two policies seem to be the
opposites. Germany provides short-term support for smaller private firms, while France
uses R&R aid to restructure huge state-owned firms. Italy’s and Spain’s policy is similar
to that of France, but the bankruptcy rates are higher.
Differences in countries’ policy can also be found in the distribution of industries, from
which the bailed out firms came (I use a 2-digit NACE codes as industry classification, see
table 13 in the Appendix A). The distribution is presented in table 4. Some countries
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Table 4: Countries’ bailouts per industry.
Country
Industry EL NL AT UK FR PT ES IT BE DE Total
services . . . . 2 . . 2 1 1 6
finance . . . 1 5 . . 2 . 1 9
transport 1 . . 2 3 . . 1 2 2 11
electric water . . . 1 . . . . . . 1
trade . . . . . . 1 . . 1 2
construction . . 1 . . 1 1 6 . 2 11
manufacturing . 2 3 . 1 3 7 3 1 17 37
mining . . . . . . 1 1 . . 2
Total 1 2 4 4 11 4 10 15 4 24 79
Population: Cross-section of firms.
grant R&R aid mainly in sectors, where negative externalities of a bankruptcy may be
painful for the whole economy (e.g. UK). Other countries bail out in sectors, where such
externalities are less likely to exist (Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Spain). Finally, there
are countries that grant R&R aid economy-wide (Italy, Germany, France). The Pearson’s
test rejects the hypothesis that the industry and the country of R&R aid receivers are
independent.
Characteristics of bailed-out firms
Table 5 presents summary statistics about R&R aid beneficiaries. Industries supported
by R&R aid are state-wide infrastructure providers in transport, electricity/water supply
and banking, but also manufacturing and construction sectors, trade, and services. A
striking observation is that nearly half of all cases involved the manufacturing industry,
a third of which went bankrupt after receiving the aid. A high share went also to the
construction sector, where bankruptcies were more common: 6 out of 10 firms left the
market. There were no bankruptcies in the financial, trade and electricity and water
supply sectors. Regarding the ownership distribution, the share of state-owned firms is
very large relative to the share of state-owned firms in the total EU economy, but the
majority of beneficiaries are still private. State-owned firms tend to go bankrupt less often
than private ones. All firms which were sold after the subsidy survived.
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Table 5: Time-invariant firm characteristics.
Total Bankrupt
Industry
services 4 1
finance 9 0
transport 11 1
electric & water supply 1 0
trade 2 0
construction 10 6
manufacturing 36 12
mining 2 2
Total 75 22
Ownership
private 38 13
state-owned 30 7
Total 68 20
For sale
unchanged 50 21
new owner 23 0
Total 73 21
Population: Cross-section of firms.
Table 6 reports summary statistics on age and employment. Age is defined as the
Table 6: Other firm characteristics.
Variable Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Age (years) 66 58 69.3 1 457
Average employment 75 5 340 11 768 36 69 671
Population: Cross-section of firms.
number of years passed between incorporation and the subsidy. R&R beneficiaries are 58
years old on average. There is one firm that was only 1 year old when it was subsidized,
which is against the rules of the guidelines, since firms younger than 4 years cannot be
bailed out. There is also one 457 years old firm. Average employment is the average
number of people employed in the period between the bailout and the year 2003.15 It
reached 5340, indicating that bailed-out firms were on average large.
15I use average employment to proxy for the size of the firms. Due to numerous missing data for this
variable, I cannot use employment in the subsidy year.
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Summary
The summary statistics highlight two typical problems with R&R aid: high mortality rate
and a strong influence of political economy issues. Bankruptcy rate amounts to about
30% of all beneficiaries and 17% of restructuring aid beneficiaries. Such a high bank-
ruptcy rate suggests possible shortcomings in the Commission’s decision-making process,
since bailouts of firms with bad prospects for survival should not have been approved.
The political economy of R&R aid involves at least three issues. State-owned firms are
overrepresented and they get more restructuring aid than private firms. Governments’
bailout policies are very heterogenous across countries and vary from a hard no-bailout
approach to frequently given support to firms from various industries. Finally, several
cases contradict the one time - last time principle, indicating that the guidelines were not
the only criterion of the Commission when approving the subsidy.
I address these issues in the next sections. In section 3, I evaluate bailouts in terms
of their effectiveness in preventing exit and in section 4, I analyze member states’ bailout
policies.
3 Exit patterns for bailed-out firms
The objective of a bailout is to prevent beneficiary’s almost certain exit. Exit patterns
are therefore an important information for the assessment of bailouts’ effectiveness: exit
implies that the bailout has failed. A concept designed to examine exit is a hazard rate,
which relates the probability of exit in a given year to the time passed since the bailout and
firms’ characteristics. Assuming that R&R aid prevents exit, the hazard rate for bailed-
out firms should be low and decreasing in time. Another reason to estimate the hazard
rate of R&R aid beneficiaries is to compare it to the existing hazard rate estimates for
firms protected by Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act in the US (Bandopadhyaya, 1994;
Li, 1998). Both institutions aim at exit prevention, so a comparison of their effectiveness
could provide interesting insights.
To the best of my knowledge, the hazard rate for R&R beneficiaries has never been
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estimated. The first empirical study on R&R aid, Chindooroy et al. (2005), provides
estimates for a time-invariant probability of survival. Their results show that rescue sub-
sidy beneficiaries have a lower survival chance than firms getting a restructuring subsidy,
and firms which got subsidies after the year 1999 had higher survival chances. As an
estimation method they use a one-period discrete choice model. However, according to
Shumway (2001) and the following literature, discrete choice models with cross-sectional
data give biased and inconsistent estimates of the probability of survival. This is because
one-period models do not take into account time changes in the proportion of surviving
subjects: if a firm went bankrupt, it is denoted as bankrupt no matter how long it lived
after the subsidy. Censored observations, on the other hand, meaning firms which survive
until the end of the observation period, are counted as survivors for ever, although it
cannot be excluded that they go bankrupt later. This is particularly important for my
data, since I have a significant number of censored observations.
The drawbacks of discrete choice models are resolved by the hazard rate approach.
Hazard rate is defined as instantaneous probability of an event (e.g. bankruptcy) at a
time point. The main characteristic of hazard models is that they define event’s risk at
each point in time. This allows to code bankrupt and censored firms correctly as active
or not at a certain point in time. In addition, time-varying variables and hence more
information can be utilized.
Two estimation methods will be applied: a non-parametric and a parametric one. In
the estimation I use an unbalanced panel data set.16 I examine 75 R&R aid beneficiaries
for which the surviving status in the year 2003 in known. The time unit is a calendar
year. It starts being counted from the year when the subsidy was given and it stops in
the year of bankruptcy or in 2003, if the firm survived until then (these are the censored
observations, which receive a special treatment in the methodology I will use). Descriptive
statistics of survival data are reported in table 7. Roughly one fourth of all observations
comes from bankrupt firms. Average survival time for bankrupt firms is shorter than for
censored firms by 1.8 years.
16For details, see the Appendix B.
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Table 7: Description of survival data.
No. of observations
Total 409
Bankrupt 92
Censored 317
Average survival (years)
Total 5.45
Bankrupt 4.18
Censored 5.98
Population: Panel.
3.1 Non-parametric estimation of exit patterns
Non-parametric estimates of the hazard rate are also called life-tables, as they were in-
vented to analyze the life length for the population in the United Kingdom and became
later the cornerstone of modern demography.17
The data is arranged in the following way: the calendar year when the subsidy was
granted is counted as year number 1, the following year gets the number 2 and so on,
until the bankruptcy or 2003, the last year of the observation period. For each year j,
the number of firms entering this year is calculated (Nj), the number of firms bankrupt
in that year (bj), the number of surviving firms for which j is the last year of observation
(censored, cj).
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The discrete hazard rate in year j is the probability of going bankrupt during the year
j, conditional on surviving until the beginning of that year. The estimate is simply
hj =
bj
Nj
, (1)
that is the number of aid beneficiaries going bankrupt in year j divided by the number of
surviving until year j. The standard error:
shj =
hj√
bj
. (2)
17John Graunt, ”Natural and Political Observations Made upon the Bills of Mortality”, London, 1662.
18All censored firms are observed until the end of the year, so actuarial adjustment is not used. Esti-
mations are done with STATA 9.
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For the years, when the number of bankruptcies is zero, standard errors cannot be calcu-
lated. The results are presented in table 8. The first row can be read as follows: during
Table 8: Life-table estimates.
Year Beg. Total Bankruptcies Lost Hazard St. Error
j Nj bj cj hj shj
1 75 4 4 0.0533 0.0267
2 67 2 5 0.0299 0.0211
3 60 4 6 0.0667 0.0333
4 50 6 1 0.1200 0.0490
5 43 1 3 0.0233 0.0233
6 39 0 8 0.0000 .
7 31 1 9 0.0323 0.0323
8 21 2 7 0.0952 0.0673
9 12 0 4 0.0000 .
10 8 2 4 0.2500 0.1767
11 2 0 1 0.0000 .
12 1 0 1 0.0000 .
Population: Panel.
the year when they received the subsidy, 4 firms out of 75 went bankrupt. Another 4 firms
went out of the sample, which means that they were subsidized in 2003 and survived that
year. The probability of going bankrupt in the first year after the subsidy is 0.0533 with
the standard error of 0.0267.
The highest number of bankruptcies took place in the fourth year after the subsidy and
it remained low after that (column 3). This suggests that the first four years are crucial
in making a successful bailout. The last bankruptcies occur 10 years after the subsidy.
The lost cases (column 4) are the censored observations ending in a given period. For
example, in the seventh year the number of lost cases reaches nine, meaning that nine
firms that were subsidized seven years before 2003 survived. Standard errors increase with
time (column 6), since the sample gets smaller and smaller. After the eighth year, the
number of observations drops below 20. In the tenth year two bankruptcies take place,
but they are given too much weight due to the low sample size. For this reason, I only
consider estimates until the eighth year.
The estimate of the hazard function is depicted in figure 2. The shape of the empirical
hazard function shows the exit patterns of the R&R aid beneficiaries. During the first
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Figure 2: Empirical hazard function.
year the hazard decreases a little, reflecting the fact that some firms decide to liquidate
immediately. Then the hazard increases and reaches the peak of 12% in the fourth year,
meaning that during the first four years more and more firms exit. Only after the fourth
year, the hazard drops to low levels.
Such a pattern suggests that R&R aid delays exit. Without the bailout firms would
exit in the first year, but thanks to the subsidy they live for up to four years longer
and exit later. The scale of this phenomenon is not negligible: 16 out of 75 firms went
bankrupt within four years after receiving an R&R subsidy.
3.2 Parametric hazard rate estimation
More detailed insights and predictions are possible with the parametric estimation of the
hazard rate, however at the expense of functional and parametric assumptions.
Methodology
The data is discrete in time: instead of precise dates, only the years of subsidies and the
bankruptcies are registered. In theory, however, firms may go bankrupt on any working
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day of the year, so the underlying true hazard is continuous. Such data needs a special
model, which takes their nature into account. Denote the probability that a firm survives
until the end of year j by S(j,Xj), where Xj is a vector of firm’s characteristics in year j.
Denote the true continuous hazard rate for a firm with characteristics Xt by θ(t,Xt) and
the the end of year j by j1. The survivor function S(j,Xj) can then be expressed as
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S(j,Xj) = exp(−
∫ j1
0
θ(u,X)du). (3)
Now I assume that the continuous hazard rate satisfies the proportionality assumption
θ(t,X) = θ0(t) exp(β
TX). (4)
This assumption means that firms with different values of the product βTXj have pro-
portional hazard rates, because the time-dependent part θ0 (called the baseline hazard)
is common for all firms. Substituting (4) into (3), the final formula for the survival
probability is
S(j,Xj) = exp(−H(j) exp(β′Xj)), (5)
with Hj =
∫ j1
0
θ0(u)du.
The discrete hazard rate is the probability of exit during the year j, conditional on
surviving until year j, which can be written down as
h(j,Xj) =
S(j,Xj)− S(j − 1, Xj)
S(j − 1, Xj) = 1−
S(j,Xj)
S(j − 1, Xj) . (6)
Substituting the expression for the continuous survival probability (5) into the discrete
hazard rate (6) and manipulating the formula I get the equation to estimate:
h(j,Xj) = 1− exp[− exp(β′Xj + γj)], (7)
19For the details on the basic relationships between survival and hazard functions, see the Appendix
C or Jenkins (2004).
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which describes the probability of bankruptcy in period j as a complementary log-logistic
function (or cloglog) of the firm-specific vector Xj and a function of time γj = log(H(j)−
H(j−1)). Note that the two variables are additively separated, which makes the equation
easy to estimate. In statistics, cloglog function is defined as g(x) = 1− exp[− exp(x)] and
it is a discrete analog of the log-logistic hazard function. It is particularly suitable for
data with few nonzero outcomes due to the asymmetry of its tails: the right tail converges
to one more quickly than the left tail converges to zero, so that the positive values are
given more weight (Buckley and Westerland, 2004).
Implementation
To estimate the equation (7), variables representing h(j,Xj), Xj and γj are needed. I
choose them in the following way. The dependent variable is an indicator of the bank-
ruptcy of firm i in year j:
BANKRij =

1 if firm i went bankrupt in year j,
0 otherwise.
(8)
As the subject characteristics Xj, subsidy type, firm’s age since incorporation, state
ownership, employment and industry are considered.
Subsidy type is included to estimate the difference in effectiveness between rescue and
restructuring aid. It is a dummy variable
TYPEi =

0 if firm i got only a rescue subsidy,
1 if firm i got a restructuring subsidy.
(9)
According to this definition, TYPE equals one also in all cases, where both a rescue
and a restructuring subsidy and in the case of two restructuring subsidies granted to one
firm. I expect the coefficient to be negative, since restructuring aid should ensure lower
bankruptcy probability of the beneficiary than rescue aid. Potentially, this variable might
be endogenous. The subsidy type, which is chosen by the government, could be correlated
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with the error term from the equation. For example, a firm which is a monopolist (like
a state-wide railway) has a very strong bargaining power, which can have influence on
both the subsidy type and the hazard. But in my data set I do not have information on
the bargaining power of aid receivers, so this correlation is captured by the error term
and creates an endogeneity problem. As a consequence, the estimates might be biased.
I deal with this problem explicitly by modelling the government’s choice and applying a
simultaneous estimation in section 4, but for now it remains a problem to keep in mind
when interpreting the hazard estimates.
Variable LNAGE is the natural logarithm of years from incorporation to the subsidy
year. I expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative, reflecting the fact that a
longer market presence gives know-how which decreases the bankruptcy probability.
A variable of particular interest is firm’s ownership PUBLICi, equal to one if the state
has a majority stake in firm i. If public firms are less efficient than private firms, the
estimated coefficient of this variable should be positive. On the other hand, if public
ownership is of an advantage in financial distress due to lobbying or high bargaining
power, the coefficient will be negative.
The size of a firm is represented by a logarithm of its average employment. I expect the
coefficients to be negative - if bailouts prevent job cuts, they should work out especially
in case of big firms. In a few specifications, public employment is separated from private
employment by using two variables: SIZEPUBLICi and SIZEPRIVATEi. Since the data
on employment has many missing points, the average number from all available during
the years 1992-2003 is used and is constant over in the panel.
Bankruptcy literature suggests that sector characteristics are significant determinants
of survival (e.g. Shumway (2001)). Business cycles also differ across sectors. I there-
fore add dummies for industries, in which firms were active: INFRASTR for electricity,
transportation and financial services, SERVICE for services and trade and MINMAN for
mining and manufacturing. Construction sector is left out as a reference category.
Finally, a function of time needs to be estimated (γj from equation (7)) to capture
duration dependence. Since the empirical hazard rate as depicted in figure 2 does not
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have any typical shape, I choose to specify the baseline hazard in a non-parametric way:
I create dummies for each survived after the subsidy year. There are four years, in which
no bankruptcies were observed (6, 9, 11 and 12), and for these years the hazard cannot
be calculated. As survival literature recommends, I drop observations from these years
and the total number of observations decreases to 355. When predicting the hazard for
those years, I assume that it is the same as in the preceding year.
The equation to estimate is thus:
P (BANKRij = 1) =g(β1TYPEi + β2LNAGEij + β3PUBLICi+ (10)
+β4SIZEPUBLICi + β5SIZEPRIVATEi + β6INFRASTRi
+β7SERVICEi + β8MINMANi +
j=8∑
j=1
β9jγj),
where g(x) = 1 − exp[− exp(x)] is the complementary log-logistic function, j is a year
index and i is a firm index. I estimate three models with different variable sets, since
for a few firms data on PUBLIC, LNAGE and employment is missing and adding these
variables to the regression reduces the number of observations. In the third model, which
includes public ownership, infrastructure dummy is dropped, because in the reduced panel
it becomes a perfect predictor for survival. Standard errors were adjusted for within-firms
correlation. Marginal effects were calculated for the average value of each variable.
The estimation method is conditional maximum likelihood. Apart from its doubtless
advantages like consistency and asymptotic efficiency, it allows to account for censoring
very easily. Suppose a subject i went bankrupt in year j and T (j) is a bankruptcy
indicator for period j. The likelihood contribution of such a (non-censored) observation
i is P (Ti = j). For a censored observation i that survives beyond the last time period j,
the likelihood contribution simply is P (Ti > j) = Si(j,Xi). In this way, information from
the censored observations can be correctly extracted in the estimation.
Results
Marginal effects are presented in table 9. The first part of the table shows the effects
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Table 9: Estimates of the marginal effects on the hazard rate.
Dependent variable: bankruptcy
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Subsidy and firm characteristics
Subsidy type -0.100∗∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.007)
lnage -0.000 0.002
(0.935) (0.747)
public 0.141
(0.519)
sizepublic -0.006
(0.537)
sizeprivate 0.011
(0.263)
infrastr -0.044∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗
(0.005) (0.019)
service -0.018 -0.012 0.042
(0.110) (0.389) (0.467)
minman -0.013 -0.008 0.021
(0.344) (0.590) (0.253)
Baseline hazard dummies
γ1 -0.026
∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.092∗∗
(0.015) (0.029) (0.046)
γ2 -0.032
∗∗ -0.033∗ -0.081∗
(0.017) (0.060) (0.055)
γ3 -0.018 -0.024 -0.065
∗∗
(0.103) (0.128) (0.048)
γ4 -0.004 -0.010 -0.050
∗∗
(0.792) (0.569) (0.025)
γ5 -0.027
∗∗ -0.029∗ -0.056∗∗
(0.034) (0.068) (0.012)
γ7 -0.024
∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.036) (0.003)
γ8 -0.007 -0.010 -0.038
∗∗∗
(0.546) (0.531) (0.004)
γ10 0.057 0.043 -0.030
∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.456) (0.007)
N 355 321 297
Nonzero outcomes 22 19 18
chi2 163.613 142.823 157.450
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
Population: Panel. P-values in parenthesis.
***(**,*) denotes significance with 1% (5%, 10%) level in a two-tailed Wald
test.
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of firm characteristics on the hazard in every year after the subsidy. As expected, the
marginal effect for TYPE is significant and negative. Ceteris paribus, firms receiving a
restructuring subsidy face the probability of bankruptcy about 10% lower than firms with
only rescue aid. Restructuring aid is indeed more effective in preventing exit of firms in
trouble. Several reasons may be responsible for this finding. Restructuring aid provides
firms with more public funds, it assists them for a longer time-period, and it forces firms
to introduce restructuring measures aimed at recovering vitality. The result is consistent
with the estimate of Chindooroy et al. (2005), who find that firms with rescue aid have
lower survival probability than restructuring aid receivers. Still, the effect might be biased
due to the potential endogeneity. If firms receiving restructuring aid are different than
firms receiving rescue aid, the difference in the hazard might be driven by firm types
rather than aid types. This issue will be addressed in section 4.
Another significant marginal effect exists for firms from the infrastructure sectors
(transportation, electricity production and distribution, financial services), which have a
lower hazard rate than the reference group – the construction sector. Holding everything
else constant, these firms went bankrupt by 4% less often. The most likely reason for
this result is that a bankruptcy of a firm from infrastructure sectors creates a negative
externality on the whole economy. Suppose a large bank goes bankrupt. Households,
businesses and governments lose their deposits, payments are disrupt, other banks working
with the bankrupt bank get in trouble. As a consequence, not only the bank but also a
large portion of the economic activity in the country is affected. Similar situations are
likely to take place if a state-wide railway tracks operator or electricity distributor exits.
The government may then find it optimal to bail out such firms to avoid the externality
of the bankruptcy on the rest of the economy. This phenomenon is known as the “too big
to fail” doctrine (Hughes and Mester, 1993; Kaufman, 2003).
The other firm-specific variables have no impact on the hazard. Marginal effects for
LNAGE are close to zero and highly insignificant. This is in line with the results in
the bankruptcy prediction literature (Shumway, 2001). Public ownership has a positive
but insignificant marginal effect. Employment does not matter as well, in line with the
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estimates of Chindooroy et al. (2005).
The second part of table 9 presents results on the duration dependence. A dummy
γj picks up the impact of the jth year after the subsidy on the hazard. In the third
specification all marginal effects are significant, in the first two specifications four out
of ten. For their interpretation, differences in their absolute values matter. A plot of
the hazard rates predicted from the model 1 for firms in the manufacturing sector which
received rescue or restructure subsidy is presented in figure 3. The predicted hazard has
Figure 3: Predicted hazard functions for the first 7 years.
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a small drop after the first year (not present in model 3), indicating that there are some
firms, which exit immediately after receiving the subsidy. These firms do not even try
to restructure and thereby do not live on the means provided by the subsidy. From the
second to the fourth year the hazard is increasing: more and more firms exit. In the fourth
year rescue aid beneficiaries exit at a high 40% rate. After the fourth year, the hazard
drops and stays at a lower level. The pattern is the same as in the non-parametric model
and suggests exit delay (called also “cash-and-carry” effect): firms cash the subsidy and
enjoy it for some years before they eventually exit. The reason for exit can be twofold:
either the firms do not want to restructure or they are not able to do it. In both cases,
however, the subsidy failed to achieve its objective.
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Robustness
The results on duration dependence are consistent with the non-parametric hazard es-
timates. To check consistency with the results of Chindooroy et al. (2005), I estimate
a simple probit with one observation per subsidized firm. The dependent variable is a
dummy equal to one for bankrupt firms and zero for surviving firms. Instead of the base-
line hazard dummies, I use a dummy RECENT equal to one for subsidies after 2000. The
two main findings of Chindooroy et al. (2005) can be replicated also in my data set. Firms
with rescue aid have lower survival chances than those with restructuring aid and firms
subsidized after the year 2000 have a higher survival probability.
The firms receiving a double subsidy are not a regular case in the data set (only 7
firms). Still, dropping all observations for these firms and estimating all three models did
not change the estimates dramatically. The only important difference is that industry
dummies become significant at 10% level in the specification 1.
3.3 Policy implications
Comparison with Chapter 11 protection
The objective of R&R aid is to give a chance for restructuring and avoiding liquidation
to firms which otherwise almost certainly exit. The same objective is given to the so-
called Chapter 11 protection by the Bankruptcy Act in the United States, passed in 1978.
However, Chapter 11 involves no transfers from the state budget. Instead, it provides
businesses in distress with protection against their creditors. The negotiations between
the firm in trouble and its creditors take place in a bankruptcy court. As a result, the debt
is often reduced and some of the firm’s assets are transferred to the creditors. According
to the statistics by Couwenberg (2001), during the years 1980-1996 41% of firms protected
by Chapter 11 were successfully reorganized.
Duration of Chapter 11 protection was investigated in several studies. The analyzed
spell is the time between filing for protection and the exit from Chapter 11 protection,
which means return to vitality in nearly all cases (Li, 1998). Li (1999) applies a log-logistic
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hazard model with Bayesian analysis on a sample of 83 firms filing for protection in the
years 1980-1994, 79 of which exit the protection before August 1994. His results show that
bigger firms, with lower firm value, and running legal disputes stay longer under Chapter
11 protection. His estimated hazard function has an inverted U-shape, it grows during the
first 21 months and then decreases to zero. Bandopadhyaya (1994) in contrast uses the
Weibull distribution specification with the sample of 74 firms in trouble from the years
1979-1990, 43 of which emerged after Chapter 11 protection as a viable business. The
results suggest that the higher outstanding interest in the firm and the higher capacity
utilization in the industry, the shorter time spent under Chapter 11 protection. The
estimated probability of leaving Chapter 11 as a vital business increases with time.
For R&R subsidies the result is opposite: exit probability increases in the first four
years. Compared with Chapter 11, R&R aid is therefore less effective in achieving its
objective. The most likely reason for this difference is the difference in the incentives that
the two programs create. Chapter 11 protection is costly to the firm in trouble by the
cost of legal services, by the cost of lost clients and contracts that look for a more stable
business partner and by the lost equity which creditors get in return for cancelling some
unpaid credits. Therefore, firms have incentives to quickly drop out of the protection
program. In contrast, it is not costly for firms in trouble to take part in a state subsidy
program. The aid beneficiaries get the aid and do not give any equity away. In this way,
incentives to apply for aid are created also for those firms, which could survive without
it, or those, which have no chance to survive in the long term.
The way out of this problem could be to introduce some features of Chapter 11 pro-
tection to R&R aid. A suggestion along these lines was made by Nitsche and Heidhues
(2006), who recommend the Commission to link R&R aid to bankruptcy proceedings.
Their main concern is exactly the distortion of the dynamic incentives caused by aid and
the fact that aid mainly supports creditors and current, trouble-making managers of firms
in distress. Opening a formal bankruptcy proceeding is usually a strong signal that the
firm’s managers have failed. If it was required for the R&R aid beneficiaries to file for
bankruptcy, it could potentially harden the soft-budget constraints problem, because the
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managers will have stronger incentives to restructure the firm earlier. Such a solution is
relatively easy to introduce.
A related problem is that European bankruptcy law is not uniform across member
states. The general approach, however, is similar. Creditreform (2002) write: “One prob-
lem that all national laws have in common is that they offer too little protection from
creditors for the companies concerned, thus hampering the chances of successful restruc-
turing and rescue concepts. More effort is put into finding a culprit than into getting a
viable company back on its feet.” This opinion is confirmed in the data. Couwenberg
(2001) calculated the ratios of the number of firms with restructuring plans confirmed
by the bankruptcy courts to the total number of bankrupt firms for four countries in the
1990s. The ratio is the highest for the U.S. (11.48%), much lower for France (2.6%) and
the U.K. (2.1%) and the lowest for Germany (0.128%%). European firms in distress have
a choice between very tough bankruptcy rules which rather take the side of the creditor
and state subsidies which provide them with cost-free support. In this situation, it is
clear that the number of bailouts in Europe is higher than the number of bailouts in the
U.S. Better bankruptcy law in Europe, which would provide more effective reorganization
procedures, could reduce the need to grant R&R aid.
A source of bias here might be sample selection problems, which I do not control for
due to unavailability of the data. I have information on all R&R aid cases, while the two
cited Chapter 11 studies take only major bankruptcies into account, leaving many small
bankruptcies out of the sample.20 On the other hand, the R&R aid cases are not the
minor cases, since they do not fall under the de minimis rule, so the firm sets are to a
large degree comparable.
European bailout control
European bailout control has been a subject of intense debate in the last years. In
2004 the guidelines were revised in order to introduce a somewhat stricter approach: the
maximal amount and the time limit for rescue aid were defined, compulsory shares of firm’s
20During the years 2001-2004, the average number of filings for Chapter 11 protection in the US reached
10 675 (from 3.12.2004 News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
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contributions to the restructuring costs introduced, etc.21 By 2009, the next revision of
the guidelines is planned. Assessment of bailouts control is also a part of the State Aid
Action Plan announced by the Commissioner Neelie Kroes.22 For this discussion, a better
understanding of weaknesses in the past European bailout control is crucial. The hazard
model estimated in this section can be used for this purpose.
All bailouts in the data set were granted by the European governments and accepted
by the Commission as compatible with the common market. A compatible bailout should
have high chances for survival. Therefore, the Commission’s performance can be assessed
by counting how many times the Commission approved a bailout which had low prob-
ability of survival. This is the so-called type II error in the decision process: a failure
to prohibit a non-compatible aid.23 Using the probability predictions from the hazard
rate model, I show that if the Commission were tougher in the aid control process and
prohibited aid more often, a number of bailout failures could be avoided.
Since the first four years show the highest mortality, it makes sense to measure success
or failure of a bailout by the probability of surviving at least the first four years. I predict
this probability for every firm in the data set (specification 1 from table 9 is used) and
count the number of firms for which the predicted probability is lower than a given
threshold. Out of these firms, I count the number of firms, which went bankrupt ex post.
Table 10 presents the results.
Table 10: European bailout control.
Policy goal Approved bailouts missing the goal
prob. of surviving > 4 Total Failed ex post
90% 43 13
80% 17 9
70% 8 6
50% 7 5
21See Nicolaides and Kekelekis (2005) for a detailed overview of the changes.
22Reforming Europes State Aid Regime: An Action Plan for Change, speech by Neelie Kroes, who
is a Member of the European Commission in charge of Competition Policy, during the Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr and the University of Leiden joint conference on European State Aid Reform.
Brussels, 14th June 2005.
23Prohibition of compatible aid (type I error) does not exist in my data set, since the Commission
usually does not prohibit notified aid cases.
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The policy goal is the required minimal probability of survival for at least 4 years.
Using the most loose policy goal of 50% gives 7 (from the total 86) subsidy approvals,
which should not have been granted. In that case, 5 ex post bankrupt beneficiaries would
not have been supported, although the remaining two ex post survivors would not have
been subsidized as well. In the case of the most strict approach requiring 90% survival
probability, every second bailout should not have been approved. That would allow to
avoid 13 subsidies to firms exiting later. The best policy goal seems to be 70%: prohibition
of these 8 bailouts would allow to avoid subsidizing 6 ex post bankrupt firms, leaving at
the same time 2 ex post surviving firms without help.
To sum up, the decision-making process in the European bailout control shows signif-
icant shortcomings. Its effectiveness in terms of helping the firms in trouble to survive
could be improved by eliminating cases with too low survival probability. In the assess-
ment of this probability, firms should be required to survive at least four years. My
estimates suggest that the most likely to go bankrupt are beneficiaries of rescue aid from
sectors other than infrastructure providers (transportation, banking, electricity and water
distribution).
4 Industrial policy: how governments bail out
One of the results so far is that the subsidy type is an important bankruptcy determinant.
Firms receiving rescue aid have lower survival chances than firms with restructuring aid.
It is, however, not clear whether this effect is due to better effectiveness of restructuring
aid vs. rescue aid or due to the fact that restructuring aid was given to firms in a
better shape. This problem will be addressed in this section. First, the determinants of
governments’ decisions to grant rescue vs. restructuring subsidy are identified. Having
done this, the unbiased effect of the restructuring aid type on the hazard is estimated.
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4.1 Industrial policy
When governments decide to bail out a firm in difficulty, they choose one of the two
types of R&R subsidies: rescue aid, which is limited in time, amount and form, and
restructuring aid, which is long-term, can be granted in any form and is high enough
to facilitate the restructuring process. Therefore, a firm receiving restructuring aid gets
substantially more support from the state than a firm receiving only rescue aid.
The choice of the subsidy type is an outcome of the government’s bailout policy.
I identify determinants of this policy by estimating a discrete choice model with the
dependent variable TYPEi as defined by (9). When TYPEi equals zero, the government
gives firm i a rescue subsidy for six months. During this time the firm decides about
its future: liquidates or plans restructuring. When TYPEi equals one, the government
engages in the firm much more by participating in the cost of the restructuring process.
This choice reveals government’s industrial policy preferences: certain firms get more
public funds than other firms.
I estimate a probit model
Pr(TYPEi = 1) = Φ(β
′Xi), (11)
where i = 1, ..., 79 is a firm index, Φ is a c.d.f. of a standard normal distribution and X is
a vector of exogenous explanatory variables. Several explanatory variables are considered,
each representing a theoretical argument for a particular government’s choice.
The literature on soft-budget constraints suggests that state-owned firms get more
state support than private firms. The reason for this is the lack of separation between
ownership and control rights (Lin et al., 1998). An owner and creditor in one body has
not enough commitment to provide sufficient incentives for managers. Another argument
is related to the fact that state-owned firms often provide social goods in addition to
goods they produce (e.g. kindergartens, pensions, housing, medical benefits). Costs of
social good production are covered directly by the state. Ro¨ller and Zhang (2005) show
that firms have incentives to become less efficient in the private good market in order to
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extract more money from the state. Public firms are also likely to be more efficient in
lobbying the government than private firms. To measure the impact of public ownership
on governments’ bailout decisions, I add the dummy variable PUBLICi to the regression
(11). The coefficient is expected to be positive.
The number of employees in the firm in trouble should also matter for a government
considering a bailout. A bankruptcy of a big firm would result in a high social cost
of many unemployed workers. Big firms are also more likely to have unions, so that
their workers are a stronger partner to negotiate with. For these reasons, the effect of
employment size on the probability of getting restructuring aid vs. rescue aid is expected
to be positive. From the government’s point of view, however, there are big differences
between public and private employment. For political economy reasons, governments
might be interested in supporting public employment more than private employment. Frey
and Pommerehne (1982) suggest that public employees have a higher participation rate
in elections than the rest of the electorate and they support higher public expenditures.
I use the variables SIZEPUBLICi and SIZEPRIVATEi to distinguish between these two
types of employment. While both positive, I expect the coefficient of private employment
to be lower than the coefficient of public employment.
Benefits and costs of a bailout can vary dramatically across different sectors. A benefit
of avoiding a bank bankruptcy is greater than in the case of a radio producer, even when
both have the equal number of employees and the same ownership structure. The reason
is that different type and size of externalities take place in different industries. In banking,
not only bank employees lose the jobs, but also all businesses and individuals who had
their accounts in the bank experience liquidity problems. An exit of a monopolist railway
or an electricity distributor puts the whole economy into a danger of missing supply of
their services. To capture such industry effects in the bailout policy equation, industry
dummies are included. The variable INFRASTRi equals one if firm i is active in electricity,
transport or financial services sector. A dummy for mining and manufacturing MINMANi
and a dummy for trade and services SERVICEi are also included. Construction sector is
left out as a reference category.
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To allow for cross-country differences in the bailout policy, dummies for five countries
with the highest number of bailouts are added: Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Austria.
Table 1 indicated that in the year 2001 there was a flip in the proportions of rescue
versus restructuring cases in the total subsidy number. This was most likely caused by
political pressure at the European level to limit R&R aid. I include a variable RECENT
equal 1 for subsidies granted in years 2001-2003 and 0 otherwise to account for possible
time effects. I expect its estimated coefficient to be negative.
Marginal effects calculated for the average value of each variable are reported in table
11. Only 65 firms are used in the estimation, due to the fact that for the remaining 14
firms data on variables PUBLIC or employment size are missing. Two model specifications
are presented: model 1 includes a total employment variable, while model 2 distinguishes
between private and public employment.
The most significant marginal effect of −68.5% is noted for the RECENT dummy.
Firms subsidized after the year 2000 had a 68.52% lower chance of getting a restructuring
subsidy than firms subsidized before 2001, ceteris paribus. This time effect is very strong,
suggesting that bailout policy of governments has starkly changed in the recent years.
The Lisbon Strategy announced in 2000 might be a driver of this change.
In both specifications the marginal effect of public ownership is statistically significant,
however it has opposite signs. In the first model, the estimate reaches 29%. In the second
model, when I control for public and private employment separately, the effect of public
ownership turns into −78.1%. The coefficients on both types of employment in model
2 are not significant. Still, p-values are not too high, so it is worth to interpret the
marginal effects. The effect of private employment is negative and the effect of public
employment is positive. How to think of these results? Public ownership alone does not
increase chances for restructuring of aid, in contrary to what I expected, but it decreases
these chances dramatically. What makes governments to spend more money on a bailout
is actually public employment. The bigger public firms, the more likely restructuring
aid. Employment in private firms has the opposite effect: the bigger a private firm, the
less likely restructuring aid. That puts the argument of the prevention of job losses by
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Table 11: Estimates of marginal effects in industrial policy equation.
Dependent variable: SUBSIDY TYPE
Variable Model 1 p-values Model 2 p-values
Firm characteristics
recent -0.685∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.685∗∗∗ 0.000
public 0.291∗ 0.057 -0.781∗ 0.060
employment -0.015 0.769
sizeprivate -0.091 0.205
sizepublic 0.081 0.329
Industry and country effects
infrastr 0.218 0.377 0.123 0.679
service 0.138 0.644 -0.007 0.986
minman -0.078 0.718 -0.211 0.362
Germany -0.029 0.906 -0.120 0.653
Italy -0.358 0.204 -0.515∗∗ 0.042
France -0.305 0.372 -0.463 0.138
Spain 0.050 0.851 0.014 0.962
Austria -0.021 0.954 -0.149 0.700
N 65 65
pseudo-R2 0.277 0.307
log-likelihood -30.936 -29.667
chi2 23.739 26.277
p 0.014 0.010
Population: Cross-section. ***(**,*) denotes significance with 1% (5%, 10%) level in a two-
tailed Wald test.
bailouts in a doubtful light: public jobs are indeed supported more, but private jobs are
disadvantaged.
Industry effects are highly insignificant. Among country effects, ITALY effect is sig-
nificant, negative and rather large. Holding everything else constant, Italian firms were
less likely to receive restructuring aid by about 51%. The effect of France is close to
significant and negative.
Robustness
Several robustness checks were performed. First, I redefine the variable RECENT as time
trend, time squared, logarithm of time and annual or biannual dummies. The results
were robust to these changes in sign and significance, but the model with the dummy
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had the highest joint-significance χ2 statistics. Therefore, I use RECENT as the best
trend-indicator. Second, I estimate the equation using the logit model. Results are
very similar as the probit estimates, suggesting the model’s stability. Third, I use firms’
age as a regressor. Age is measured in years between incorporation and the subsidy. The
coefficient was insignificant in the regression and I decided to omit it because of numerous
missing data in this variable.
Privatization and old public firms
Two important variables were perfectly predicting the subsidy choice. The first one is
privatization. Privatization through bailouts means that a public firm was bailed out and,
having received the subsidy, it was sold to private owners. Among all bailouts in years
1992-2003, 13 cases involved privatization. In a few cases, it was a requirement of the
Commission in the approval process, but usually it was an initiative of the governments
themselves. All 13 privatized firms got restructuring aid, implying that governments used
substantial public funds to increase the value of the firm before the subsequent sale.
The second perfect predictor is age for state-owned firms. All 8 state-owned firms
older than 100 years received exclusively restructuring aid, suggesting that governments
supported old state-owned enterprizes.
Summary
Summing up, the time dummy has the most important impact on the governments’ choice
of the subsidy type. The estimates suggest that there was a structural change in the
bailout policy: after the year 2000 governments chose rescue subsidies with a higher
probability than restructuring aid, and the opposite is true for the earlier years. State-
owned firms get more restructuring aid mainly due to governments’ preference to support
public employment. Old state-owned firms and privatized firms were supported with
only restructuring aid. Industrial sectors do not matter in the policy choice. Italian
governments grant rescue aid somewhat more often than restructuring aid, while other
governments do not have a special policy.
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4.2 Endogenous subsidy choice
In this section, the equations (10) and (11) are estimated simultaneously. Such an ap-
proach allows to correct for potential endogeneity of the subsidy type variable in the
hazard equation. It is also a useful robustness check for the earlier results. Since esti-
mators for a simultaneous model with a discrete-time hazard rate and a discrete-choice
equation are to my knowledge not yet available,24 I translate the hazard rate equation
into a time-invariant binary outcome equation with one observation per firm. Then a bi-
variate probit estimator can be used.25 Duration dependence will be captured by adding
the RECENT dummy.
The problem has a recursive nature: first the government decides which type of aid
to grant and then, often a few years later, competition in the market forces the firms
to exit or not. Therefore, a recursive bivariate probit specification seems appropriate:
equation (11) explains the choice of the subsidy type, equation (10) explains the exit
pattern depending on the subsidy type.26 The error terms in both equations could be
correlated if there are unobservable factors that have an impact both on the subsidy type
choice and the bankruptcy chances. Examples of such factors are the degree of firms’
unionization or politicians having private information about firms. In the equations, I
do not control for them directly, but they are taken into account using error terms. The
econometric model which best fits this situation is a bivariate probit. I will therefore
estimate the following model:

TYPEi = I(β′1X1i + 1i > 0) IndustrialPolicy
BANKRi = I(αTYPEi + β′2X2i + 2i > 0), Bankruptcy
(12)
where i is a firm index, vector (1, 2) has a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero,
unit variances and corr(1, 2) = ρ. I apply maximum likelihood estimation method. Table
24This is left for future research. For a continuous-time hazard, a full information maximum-likelihood
estimator was recently proposed by Boehmke et al. (2006).
25E.g. Wooldridge (2002), p. 477.
26A relevant remark here is that when governments choose the subsidy type, they possibly take exit
probability into account, so that exit is also endogenous to the subsidy type. This issue is addressed in
the subsection on the robustness of the results.
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12 presents the results. To facilitate a comparison, I include estimates of coefficients for
several models. Models 1, 2, 4 and 5 are the results of single-equation probit estimations.
Models 3 and 6 are the simultaneous specifications. In models 1-3 I control for employment
in general, while in models 4-6 I distinguish between private and public employment.
The log-likelihood of the simultaneous models is higher than the sum of the log-
likelihoods for the two equations estimated separately. The likelihood-ratio test indeed
rejects the hypothesis that ρ = 0 (for model 3: test statistics χ2(1) = 6.7956, p-value
0.0091, for model 6: χ2(1) = 6.04384, p-value 0.0140). According to Monfardini and
Radice (2006), the likelihood-ratio test is the best method to test correlation of equations
in case of small samples. Therefore, the results indicate that the equations in model (12)
are correlated: unobserved factors influencing the chance for a restructuring aid have
impact on the probability of bankruptcy.
Simultaneous estimation of both equations (models 3 and 6) does not change the
coefficients’ estimates too much, but suggests that the endogeneity issue is important
for the results. In the bankruptcy equation of the simultaneous models, the coefficient
on TYPE decreases when compared with the independent estimation. I therefore find
that having separated the effect of beneficiaries characteristics on the industrial policy,
restructuring aid is even more effective in preventing exit. If beneficiary characteristics
erode the performance of restructuring aid, then firms receiving restructuring aid are not
necessarily the most efficient ones.
In the industrial policy equation of model 3, the positive coefficient of PUBLIC be-
comes smaller and less significant than in model 1, but its p-value of 0.157 is still not too
high. This result suggests that public firms have a better chance to receive restructuring
aid than private firms. The coefficient of PUBLIC in the bankruptcy equation is, however,
not significant, suggesting that public firms are not better in survival than private firms.
Therefore, governments’ preference for public firms cannot be explained by these firms’
higher probability of fulfilling bailouts’ goals.
The effect of SIZEPRIVATE in model 6 becomes significant and much lower than in
model 4. This implies that the bigger a private firm, the less likely restructuring aid. The
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Table 12: Estimates of coefficients in the bivariate probit model.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Industrial policy
recent -2.031∗∗∗ -1.921∗∗∗ -2.040∗∗∗ -1.737∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
public 0.821∗ 0.582 -2.532 -3.220
(0.077) (0.157) (0.250) (0.118)
employment -0.042 -0.097
(0.769) ( 0.513)
sizeprivate -0.246 -0.438∗∗
(0.204) (0.026)
sizepublic 0.219 0.110
(0.326) (0.576)
infrastr 0.649 0.883 0.346 0.676
(0.433) (0.259) (0.694) (0.336)
service 0.409 0.345 -0.019 -0.279
(0.679) (0.710) (0.986) (0.782)
minman -0.211 -0.150 -0.581 -0.395
(0.720) (0.823) (0.377) (0.562)
Germany -0.077 -0.207 -0.318 -0.693
(0.906) (0.726) (0.650) (0.215)
France -0.788 -0.462 -1.237 -1.072
(0.382) (0.504) (0.207) (0.151)
Italy -0.931 -1.130 -1.406 -1.750∗∗
(0.227) (0.108 ) (0.101) (0.042)
Spain 0.139 -0.114 0.037 -0.386
(0.854) (0.857) (0.962) (0.568)
Austria -0.055 -0.221 -0.385 -0.796
(0.953) (0.781) (0.694) (0.342)
Bankruptcy
Subsidy type -1.496∗∗∗ -2.679∗∗∗ -1.491∗∗∗ -2.611∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
recent -1.339∗∗ -1.845∗∗∗ -1.479∗∗ -2.026∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)
public -0.053 0.301 1.487 1.153
(0.894) (0.412) (0.405) (0.490)
employment -0.018 -0.028
(0.879) (0.798)
sizeprivate 0.101 0.048
(0.579) (0.777)
sizepublic -0.118 -0.081
(0.478) (0.603)
service -0.327 -0.498 -0.180 -0.295
(0.711) (0.512) (0.841) (0.694)
minman 0.296 0.130 0.372 0.244
(0.460) (0.720) (0.367) (0.523)
N 65 65 65 65 65 65
pseudo-R2 0.277 0.190 0.307 0.200
log-likelihood -30.936 -32.489 -60.403 -29.667 -32.090 -58.359
chi2 23.74 15.26 68.65 26.277 16.061 68.308
p 0.013 0.000 0.018 0.010 0.025 0.000
Population: Cross-section. P-values in parenthesis.
***(**,*) denotes significance with 1% (5%, 10%) level in a two-tailed Wald test.
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size of public firms is less important for the subsidy choice. This observation supports the
earlier suggestion that governments discriminate between public and private employment
to the disadvantage of the latter.
The coefficient’s estimates for the RECENT variable in both equations of the simul-
taneous models are significant. Compared with the single-equation specifications, they
change their magnitudes rather moderately. Thus, timing and duration play an important
role in both processes. In the exit process, firms subsidized only in the last three years
had lower bankruptcy probability. Regarding the industrial policy, rescue aid was more
likely in the last three years.
Robustness
If governments condition the decision about the subsidy type on the chances of the firm
in trouble to survive, the variable BANKR should be present in the second equation of
the model (12). However, a simultaneous equation model with two endogenous discrete
variables one being a function of the other suffers from logical inconsistency (Maddala,
1983, p. 117.). I address this issue by estimating a “reverse” recursive model, in which
the probability of bankruptcy is a function of exogenous variables only and the subsidy
type choice is a function of the bankruptcy chances and a set of exogenous variables:27

TYPEi = I(αBANKRi + β′2X2i + 2i > 0), IndustrialPolicy
BANKRi = I(β′1X1i + 1i > 0) Bankruptcy
(13)
However, this regression does not go through the basic diagnostics. In the specification
with one employment variable, the likelihood ratio test cannot reject the hypothesis that
ρ = 0 (χ2(1) = 0.000293, p-value 0.9863). The hypothesis that the coefficients are
jointly insignificant cannot be rejected either (Wald χ2(17) = 20.24, p-value 0.262). The
specification with separated public and private employment gives similar results. The
model (13) is without any doubt inferior to the model (12).
27This approach is used by Beck (2004).
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5 Conclusions
The results in this paper contribute to the understanding of the European bailout policy
used in the past. Increasing bankruptcy rate and a relatively high share of failing bailouts
suggest scope for improvements in this policy. Soft-budget constraints and moral hazard
are of particular concern. A simple and practical solution to remedy this problem was
already suggested by Nitsche and Heidhues (2006) and I strongly support it: bailouts
should be limited to firms in formal bankruptcy. In this way, incentives of managers to
apply for a bailout will be reduced. Chapter 11 protection in the U.S. provides an example
of this approach.
Empirical evidence on bailouts of state-owned firms shows weaknesses of using state aid
as an instrument to prevent bankruptcy of firms. State-owned firms are overrepresented
among R&R aid beneficiaries and receive restructuring aid more often than their private
competitors. At the same time, they do not go bankrupt less often. Clearly, governments
favor public firms in the bailout decisions. Such a policy is almost certain to create
soft-budget constraints for state-owned firms.
An important issue not addressed in this paper is the selection process to the R&R
subsidy program. Far more firms go bankrupt than are bailed out. An empirical analysis
of the determinants of the choice to bailout or not would provide more detailed evidence
on the bailout policies in member states. Another interesting research problem is an
empirical analysis of balance sheet data for R&R aid beneficiaries before aid and during
the restructuring process. Going to the accounting data would allow to account for the
amount and form of aid and would provide evidence on the sources of distress, how the
aid was spent and how many jobs it saved. These are issues left for further research.
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A Industry classification
NACE (Rev.1) comes from the French term Nomenclature statistique des Activite´s e´conomiques
dans la Communaute´ Europe´enne (Statistical classification of economic activities in the
European Community) and is a European industry classification system. At the 2-digit
level NACE is fully compatible with ISIC.
Table 13: Two-digit NACE classification.
Industry NACE codes
Mining 12-14
Manufacturing 15-37
Electricity and water supply 40-41
Construction 45
Trade 50-52
Transport 60-64
Financial services 65-67
Other services 55, 70-99
B Data set description
The data set contains information on R&R subsidy cases in the European Union in years
1995-2003. It is a unique data set created from four data sources. Subsidy information
comes from the texts of the European Commission’s decision and the report by London
Economics (2004) provided by Competition Directorate General. Financial and ownership
information on firms from sectors other than financial comes from AMADEUS database
provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. For firms from the financial sector I
use annual reports, if available. Other firm-level data comes from newspapers.
I construct three data sets. A cross-section of decisions is a set with a decision as a
unit of observation, it entails 86 observations in total. A cross-section of firms is a set
with a firm receiving R&R aid as a unit of observation, it entails 79 observations in total.
Finally, a panel is a two-dimensional set with aid receivers observed across time.
I build a panel based on the following principles. Subjects in the panel are all R&R
subsidy beneficiaries, whose surviving status is known in at least one year. This amounts
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to 75 firms. Each firm was observed from the year it was bailed out until 2003 or its
earlier bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is defined as ceasing the major activity of a firm. 22
R&R subsidy beneficiaries went bankrupt in the time between receiving the subsidy and
the end of 2003. The remaining 53 firms were observed until the year 2003 without going
bankrupt. Following the survival literature, I call them right-censored or lost, but in my
context they are simply firms, which from the subsidy year up to 2003 stayed in operations.
All in all, for the survival analysis I have an unbalanced panel of 409 observations, with
75 firms observed during the years 1992-2003.
Table 14: Variables used and their sources.
Variable Definition Source
Subsidy year Year of subsidy transfer decision texts
Subsidy type Rescue or restructure decision texts
Country Country of the subsidizing gov-
ernment
decision texts
State-owned Dummy equal to 1 if the state
owns more than 50% of shares
decision texts, AMADEUS, LE report
Year of incorporation Year in which the firm started op-
erations
AMADEUS, LE report
Year of bankruptcy Year in which the firm went
bankrupt
LE report, newspapers
Industry Industry with the highest share in
the revenue, based on NACE (see
table 13)
AMADEUS, LE report
For sale Dummy equal to 1 if after get-
ting the subsidy the firm was
sold.
LE report, newspapers
Employment Number of employees AMADEUS, LE report, annual reports
C Basic definitions in survival analysis
This appendix is based on Jenkins (2004). Survival analysis deals with a time-to-event
random variable called also spell length, spell duration or survival length. The researcher
is interested in the distribution of time needed to observe the event. The event can be
anything, but in the first applications it was death and for this reason it is often referred
to as a failure. Examples of the applications include examination of the effectiveness of
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medicines by comparing life lengths of treated and non-treated patients, failure rates for
machines in the production process, bankruptcy rates, marriage patterns etc. In each
case, the failure is an event of transition from one state to another: death, bankruptcy,
marriage.
Assume first that time is continuous. T is the spell length, the random variable with
the distribution function f(t) and a c.d.f. F (t) (called also the failure function). The
survivor function is the probability of survival S(t) = Pr(T > t) = 1 − F (t). The
continuous hazard rate is defined as
θ(t) =
f(t)
1− F (t) (14)
and can be interpreted as an instantaneous “probability” of failure in time t conditional on
surviving until t. It is not a real probability, however, since its values are not necessarily
from the range [0, 1].
The basic relationships between the failure, survivor and hazard functions can be
derived as follows.
θ(t) =
f(t)
1− F (t) =
∂(1− F (t))/∂t
1− F (t) (15)
=
∂[− ln(1− F (t))]
∂t
=
∂[− ln(S(t))]
∂t
. (16)
Now integrate both sides
∫ t
0
θ(u)du = − ln(1− F (t))|t0 (17)
and use F (0) = 0 and ln 1 = 0 to get
ln[1− F (t)] = ln(S(t)) = −
∫ t
0
θ(u)du (18)
S(t) = exp(−
∫ t
0
θ(u)du) (19)
S(t) = exp[−H(t)] (20)
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where H(t) =
∫ t
0
θ(u)du = − ln(S(t)) is an integrated hazard function. The final relation-
ship is just an observation that
H(t) ≥ 0, (21)
∂H(t)
∂t
= θ(t). (22)
Now suppose the time is discrete. Discrete time means that the real timeline is divided
into intervals:
[0 = a0, a1], (a1, a2], (a2, a3], ...(ak−1, ak = ∞]. (23)
The probability of failure at the end of interval j is then F (aj). The survivor function at
the end of the interval j is S(aj) = Pr(T > aj) = 1− F (aj).
The discrete hazard rate for the interval j is defined as the probability of failure in
the interval j, conditional on surviving until the beginning of the interval j
h(aj) = Pr(aj−1 < T ≤ aj|T > aj−1) (24)
=
Pr(aj−1 < T ≤ aj)
Pr(T > aj−1)
(25)
=
S(aj)− S(aj−1)
S(aj−1)
(26)
= 1− S(aj)
S(aj−1)
. (27)
Note that the discrete hazard rate is a proper (conditional) probability.
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